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We argue that the paradox of flexibility - that more flexi-
ble price results in worse outcomes when zero lower bound
is binding - is ruled out once we consider an implicit equilib-
rium selection mechanism used when solving a New Keynesian
model often not explicitly stated - the symmetric limit condi-
tion. Dropping the implicit mechanism leads to extraneous
multiple equilibria, and breakdown of New Keynsian Phillips
curve. The standard equilibrium selection in zero lower bound
circumstances is questioned, given the symmetric limit condi-
tion.
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I. Introduction
When zero lower bound is binding, models in the New Keynesian tradition
have the paradox of flexibility in the standard interpretation - that as price
becomes flexible, deflation and lower output circumstances become worse,
despite an actual flexible-price economy behaving otherwise.
In Cochrane (2017), it was argued that this is sensitive to a choice of an
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2equilibrium selection mechanism and that non-standard equilibrium selec-
tion mechanisms are justified economic logic-wise.
Theoretical responses to Cochrane (2017) that argue non-standard equi-
librium selection mechanisms are not justified economic logic-wise have since
appeared - see Evans and McGough (2018) and Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Wood-
ford (2019) as examples. They mainly involve how agents actually set expec-
tations and the rational expectation limit of such expectation mechanisms
- in other words, we should start from a model not utilizing rational expec-
tation to select a rational expectation equilibrium.
We provide another dimension to the debate: when solving for an equi-
librium, New Keynesian models have an additional equilibrium selection
condition that is not explicitly stated. We call this the symmetric limit
condition:
The symmetric limit condition refers to an argument that as
firms in an economy become symmetric, their equilibrium values
must become symmetric as well.
We argue that rejection of the condition leads to the benchmark New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve (PC) being unjustified and multiple equilibria prevailing
in the basic New Keynesian model (see Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987),
Woodford (2003) and Gal´ı (2015) for details of the basic New Keynesian
model) that often is used to derive the three-equation model.
The argument is simple. When deriving a price-setting equation for a
monopolistic competition economy, the basic New Keynesian model uses an
argument that an individual firm has zero effect on aggregate price level and
output because there are infinitely many firms. This enforces an equilibrium
outcome of firms to be symmetric when specifications of firms are symmetric
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to each other.
However, we do not actually believe that there are infinitely many firms
- number of firms being infinite is introduced for tractability. Furthermore,
specifications of firms are generally asymmetric, which opens up for mul-
tiple equilibria even in the symmetric limit. To eliminate such extraneous
equilibria, the symmetric limit condition must be imposed - as specifica-
tions of firms become symmetric, an equilibrium outcome of firms must be
symmetric as well.
In New Keynesian models that follow Calvo pricing (Calvo (1983)), price
rigidity introduces additional heterogeneity of firms. If specification of firms
are symmetric when firms have full flexibility on pricing, heterogeneity in
specifications of firms only exists due to price rigidity. The imposition of
the symmetric limit condition thus requires that as price becomes flexible,
an equilibrium outcome of firms becomes symmetric.
In usual circumstances, the standard equilibrium selection picks out a
flexible-price limit that is equivalent to an actual flexible-price economy.
When zero lower bound becomes binding, however, the paradox of flexibil-
ity arises under the standard equilibrium selection, which contradicts the
symmetric limit condition.
Thus, one must choose one of the following: 1) rational expectation equi-
libria are useless for economic analysis, 2) reject the symmetric limit condi-
tion and accept multiple equilibria under basic New Keynesian restrictions
and search for an additional specification and restriction or a different model
to ensure a unique ‘New Keynesian’-style equilibrium, 3) reject the standard
equilibrium selection. Out of the three options, the most conservative and
least disruptive option is 3).
4II. Flexible-price New Keynesian model
Let us state the basic flexible-price New Keynesian model. For conve-
nience, we assume that an economy is deterministic, but conclusions of
analysis here applies to stochastic cases without loss of generality.
The representative consumer has utility function U that it maximizes:
(1) U =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Ct
1−σ
1− σ
−
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
where β is time preference discount factor, Ct is consumption, Nt is labor
utilized. It is subject to the budget constraint:
(2) PtCt +
Bt
1 + it
≤ WtNt + Ft +Bt−1
where Pt is price level, Bt is central bank-issued bonds, it is nominal interest
rate set on Bt, Wt is wage, and Ft is dividends paid from firms.
There is monopolistic competition in an economy - we apply the standard
CES toolkit, such that:
(3) Ct ≡
(∫ 1
0
Cit
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
where Cit is consumption of goods at firm i. Price level Pt is defined such
that PtCt =
∫ 1
0
PitCit di. In equilibrium, Yt = Ct and Cit = Yit, and thus
from now on, we will use Y and C interchangeably.
The resulting price level and demand function for Yit are:
(4) Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
) 1
1−ε
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(5) Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
Now specification of firms. Firms are assumed to utilize homogeneous labor,
its only production factor, such that wage level must be same across firms.
Firms have production function:
(6) Yit = AtN
1−α
it
with
∫ 1
0
Nit di = Nt. Firms maximize profits Fit, which are all given out as
dividends:
(7) Fit = PitYit −WtNit
Each firm selects Pit to maximize profit, given its demand function for Yit.
Firms take Wt as given.
Since firm i is considered of negligible size given that there are infinitely
many firms, we now assume that change of Pit does not affect Pt and Yt. We
do not need to assume that an equilibrium outcome of firms must be sym-
metric because firm specifications are symmetric. The profit maximization
solution then says:
Pit =
ε
ε− 1
MCit
=
ε
ε− 1
1
1− α
Wt
At
1/(1−α)
Yit
α
1−α
=
ε
ε− 1
1
1− α
Wt
At
1/(1−α)
[(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
] α
1−α
(8)
whereMCit refers to marginal cost, when total cost isWtNit = Wt(Yit/At)
1/(1−α).
6Thus,
(9) (Pit)
1+ εα
1−α =
ε
ε− 1
1
1− α
Wt
At
1/(1−α)
(Pt)
εα
1−α (Yt)
α
1−α
Because we assumed Pt and Yt are not changed by individual firm decisions
due to firm size being negligible, Equation (9) suggests that every firm must
have the same equilibrium, even when we do not impose the symmetric limit
condition.
However, this result depends crucially on the number of firms being in-
finite. Since no one actually believe in the number of firms being infinite,
and this is only introduced for tractability reasons, we have to think of the
infinite-number-of-firms economy as the limit point of finite-number-of-firms
economies.
In a finite-number-of-firms economy, we can no longer assume that each
firm decision does not affect an aggregate outcome. Furthermore, without
imposing that an equilibrium outcome of firms be symmetric because firm
specifications are symmetric, heterogeneous outcomes are possible. This is
especially so, given that we can slightly tweak firm specifications as to be
not symmetric.
In such a case, as the infinite-number-of-firms limit is approached from
finite-number-of-firms economies, heterogeneity of firm outcomes can actu-
ally increase, and we can no longer treat decisions of some firms as not
affecting aggregate price level and output even in the limit. This possibility
is only eliminated when we impose the symmetric limit condition.
In the appendix, we fully derive and explore multiple equilibria aspects of
a flexible-price New Keynesian economy when there are finitely many firms
and the symmetric limit condition is not imposed.
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A. Symmetric limit condition
Required imposition of the symmetric condition has not been problematic
and has been done implicitly without notice, since almost everyone accepts
the symmetric limit condition.
While it is true that individual firms are different even when they are sym-
metric in specification - after all, New Keynesian models live in a monop-
olistic competition economy and each firm has some form of ‘brand power’
- each firm can easily copy another firm at its advantage, unless there is a
restriction on that.
While our discussion of the symmetric limit condition involved the New
Keynesian CES setup that dates back to Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987),
the condition is not only applicable to such a setup. Since the above outside-
model economic motivation of the condition applies generally, the symmet-
ric limit condition must be understood as an implicit equilibrium selection
mechanism that is widely accepted such that it is used without much explicit
notice.
B. Generalization of the multiple equilibria result
The multiple equilibria result when the symmetric limit condition is not
imposed can be generalized. Thus it is not a particular specification that
drives qualitative conclusions in this paper.
The spirit of New Keynesian modeling can be identifies as follows:
• Monopolistic competition. This gives us n price-setting equations
when there are n firms.
• The aggregate demand effect that affects every firm. In other words,
demand Yit for the product of firm i depends on aggregate demand Yt.
8Since there are n firms, there are n demand equations, one for each
firm producing only one variety of products.
• Consistent functional form of aggregate production and aggregate de-
mand Yt can be defined such that one can derive aggregate price level
Pt from Yt and budget constraints. Additionally, one can derive func-
tional form of Yt from functional form of Pt and demand functions as
well.
There are 2n equations and 2n + 1 variables (all Pit, all Yit and Yt) when
the market uses only price signals, in fashion of traditional general equilib-
rium. We can eliminate variable Pit by setting it to be 1 and eliminate the
corresponding price-setting equation by invoking Walras’ law. This finally
gives us 2n− 1 equations and 2n variables. Thus multiple equilibria prevail
if without an additional market mechanism or imposition of the symmetric
limit condition.
III. Zero lower bound model
We now consider the basic deterministic sticky-price New Keynesian model.
For the purpose here, we utilize the log-linearized three-equation model
(around zero-inflation steady state):
(10) y˜t = y˜t+1 − σ
−1 (it − pit+1 − r
n
t )
where y˜t is output gap, pit is inflation rate, r
n
t is natural real rate of interest.
(11) pit = βpit+1 + κy˜t
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where as κ→∞, firms become more flexible in price setting. Equation (11)
is often called as the basic New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC).
We now introduce the zero lower bound setup in Werning (2012), which
is shared by Cochrane (2017). At 0 ≤ t < T , an economy faces rnt = r,
where r is negative. it = 0 at 0 ≤ t < T . At T ≤ t, it = r
n
t is assumed.
As Cochrane (2017) emphasizes, this interest rate peg structure simplifies
analysis without loss of generality - we should not think that it is this peg
structure that drives qualitative conclusions.
A. Standard equilibrium selection and paradox of flexibility
The standard equilibrium selection picks piT = 0 and piT+1 = 0, which
imply y˜t = 0 and pit = 0 for t ≥ T . Let us look at t = T − 1.
(12) y˜T−1 = σ
−1r
from Equation (10),
(13) piT−1 = κy˜T−1 = κσ
−1r
from Equation (11) and (12).
Now let us look at t = T − 2.
(14) y˜T−2 = y˜T−1 − σ
−1 (−r − piT−1) = σ
−1r − σ−1
(
−r − κσ−1r
)
(15) piT−2 = βpiT−1 + κy˜T−2 = βκσ
−1r + κ
[
σ−1r − σ−1
(
−r − κσ−1r
)]
The paradox of flexibility now can be identified: as κ → ∞, y˜T−2 → −∞,
10
piT−2 → −∞. This is not a one-period event: the paradox of flexibility
appears at 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2.
B. Calvo pricing and symmetric limit condition
Under Calvo pricing, price rigidity induces heterogeneous specifications of
firms - some firms are stuck at some price while other firms are free to change
their price. More specifically, at each period, a firm has constant probability
θ of being unable to change its price. As price rigidity is reduced, firm
specifications become more symmetric. The point of the above paradox of
flexibility then is that specifications becoming symmetric does not guarantee
an equilibrium outcome being more symmetric as well.
But this violates the symmetric limit condition. Note also that the sym-
metric limit condition is implicitly invoked when solving for the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve in Equation (11) - symmetric firms that are freed to
set price are assumed to set the same price.
To maintain the symmetric limit condition, the most conservative option
is to reject the standard equilibrium selection - to look for an alternative piT
and piT+1 selection that respects the symmetric limit condition.
C. Rotemberg pricing and symmetric limit condition
In Rotemberg pricing (Rotemberg (1982)), firm specifications are sym-
metric even when there is price rigidity, as long as they are symmetric in
the flexible-price case. Thus, it may seem that one may recast the paradox
of flexibility in a Rotemberg pricing model that is free from the symmetric
limit condition issue. We can no longer say that as price rigidity is reduced,
firm heterogeneity is reduced, since firms are already symmetric even when
price is rigid.
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But reasons why we choose a particular equilibrium selection mechanism
would still hold regardless of whether one uses Calvo, Rotemberg or some
other means of introducing price rigidity. While we invoked the symmetric
limit condition to argue that the standard equilibrium selection may not
be the right one, we still have to choose a particular equilibrium selection
mechanism and provide economic logic behind the selection. Such economic
logic holds regardless of whether the symmetric limit condition is binding
or not. Plausible selection mechanisms are explored in Cochrane (2017) - in
this paper, we do not explore this matter.
Thus, unless one argues that a Calvo pricing model is mostly irrelevent
to analysis of real economies, reasons for a particular equilibrium selection
carry over to models with different means of introducing price rigidity.
IV. Conclusion
We argued that the symmetric limit condition is implicitly used when
solving for a New Keynesian model, regardless of which explicit equilibrium
selection is utilized. In zero lower bound contexts simplified as in Werning
(2012), the symmetric limit condition rules out the standard equilibrium
selection when there is Calvo pricing. The New Keynesian paradox of flexi-
bility is ruled out by the symmetric limit condition. While this paper focused
on Calvo pricing, unless Calvo pricing is irrelevent to economic analysis, eco-
nomic logic behind an alternative equilibrium selection mechanism that is
compatible with the symmetric limit condition in Calvo setups carries over
to models with alternative means of introducing rigidity.
Given that empirical evidence of paradoxes given by the standard equi-
librium selection, when solving a New Keynesian model, is debatable, as
12
can be seen in Wieland (2019), analysis in this paper is not of mere the-
oretical curiosity. This paper provides one more compelling evidence on
why the standard equilibrium selection might be wrong one to take, in light
of Cochrane (2017), despite theoretical arguments supporting the standard
equilibrium selection, most strongly learnability arguments as in Evans and
McGough (2018). Unless one is willing to give up rational expectation anal-
ysis or find an alternative mean of carrying out economic analysis with New
Keynesian emphasis, the standard equilibrium selection and the paradox of
flexibility must go.
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Verification of multiple flexible-price equilibria when the
symmetric limit condition is not imposed
In this appendix, we do not invoke the symmetric limit condition. Thus
even if firm specifications are symmetric, an equilibrium outcome of firms
is not granted to be symmetric. As before, we analyze a CES monopolistic
competition economy but with finite number of firms.
The representative consumer has utility function U that it maximizes
Equation (1):
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Ct
1−σ
1− σ
−
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
where β is time preference discount factor, Ct is consumption, Nt is labor
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utilized. It is subject to the budget constraint as in Equation (2):
PtCt +
Bt
1 + it
≤ WtNt + Ft +Bt−1
where Pt is price level, Bt is central bank-issued bonds, it is nominal interest
rate set on Bt, Wt is wage, and Ft is dividends paid from firms.
There is monopolistic competition in an economy - we apply the standard
CES toolkit, such that:
(A1) Ct ≡
(∑
i
C
ε−1
ε
it
) ε
ε−1
where Cit is consumption of goods at firm i.
Price level Pt, defined with PtCt =
∑
i PitCit, is derived as:
(A2) Pt =
(∑
i
P 1−εit
) 1
1−ε
and demand function for firm i is as in Equation (5):
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
In equilibrium, Yt = Ct and Cit = Yit, and thus from now on, we will use Y
and C interchangeably.
Now specification of firms. Firms are assumed to utilize homogeneous
labor, its only production factor, such that wage level must be same across
firms. Firms have production function as in Equation (6):
Yit = AtN
1−α
it
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with
∑
iNit = Nt. Firms maximize profits Ft defined as in Equation (7),
which are all given out as dividends:
Ft = PitYit −WtNit
Each firm selects Pit to maximize profit, given its demand function for Yit.
Firms take Wt as given.
Now the intuition is clear: because Yt and Pt are now each affected by
Yit and Pit, Pit does depend on value of Yit in the solution of the profit
maximization problem. Thus, there will be multiple equilibria.
Firm i’s price-setting function would be, substituting wage demand (labour
supply) function coming from the consumer optimization problem and pro-
duction function:
(A3) Pit = ft(Yit, {Yjt}j 6=i, {Pj}j 6=i)
where ft refers to a function. Recall the demand function for firm i in
Equation (5):
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
There are 2n − 1 equations when there are n firms: n − 1 equations from
Equation (A3) and n equations from Equation (5) - having set one of Pit to
be 1 or some constant value. We invoke Walras’ law to allow for elimination
of an equation for Pit. (We know that ‘excess demand’ of a product must
be zero when the market for other products clears.) There are 2n variables:
n− 1 instances of Pit, n instances of Yit and Yt.
Pt is determined from {Pit}. Yt can be determined from {Yit}, but if we
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substitute Yt with Equation (A1), then since Yit ∈ {Yit} and given the form
of Equation (A1), we would not be able to write the demand function in
form of:
Yit = gt({Pjt}, {Yjt}j 6=i)
Furthermore, by construction, Equation (A2) and Equation (5) replicate
Equation (A1). The proof goes as follows:
Ct = (PtCt)Pt
ε−1


(∑
i
P 1−εit
) 1
1−ε


−ε
= (PtCt)Pt
ε−1
(∑
i
P 1−εit
) ε
ε−1
=
[∑
i
(
P−εit PtCtP
ε−1
t
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
=

∑
i
([
Pit
Pt
]−ε
Ct
) ε−1
ε


ε
ε−1
=
[∑
i
C
ε−1
ε
it
] ε
ε−1
(A4)
The first line in Equation (A4) follows from the definition of Pt in Equation
(A2). The second, third and fourth line are tautological. The fifth line
follows from Equation (5).
Thus there are multiple equilibria, since there are only 2n − 1 equations
for 2n variables.
